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1 Introduction
It is observed that countries often engage themselves in multidimensional competition
for foreign owned mobile capital. Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) and Bellak et al. (2009)
document that the effect of public investment is as large as that of tax rate on capital
flows in many European countries. It is also found that, in spite of setting high tax
rates, countries can attract capital by spending more on productivity enhancing public
investment.
Recently, a number of studies have attempted to analyze the tax-public investment
interaction in the case of competition for mobile capital. It helps us to understand a variety
of issues: effects of fiscal equalization schemes on the equilibrium tax and public investment
(Keen and Marchand, 1997; Hindriks et al., 2008), implications of firm heterogeneity and
tax harmonization (Zissimos and Wooders, 2008), effects of interregional-spillover of public
investment (Dembour and Wauthy, 2009), role of country size (Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011),
so on so forth. However, this set of studies assume that competing regions are symmetric in
terms of their objective functions and their decisions to spend on productivity enhancing
public investment are exogenously determined. Further, existing studies consider either
net tax revenue (Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Dembour and Wauthy, 2009; Pieretti and
Zanaj, 2011) or social welfare (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Hindriks et al., 2008) as objective
function. This paper analyses decisions to provide public investment by considering more
general objective functions a` la Pal and Sharma (2013), which encompasses social welfare
and net tax revenue as special cases and allows us to analyze the implications of asymmetric
objective functions of regions.1
Considering two regions competing for foreign owned mobile capital, this paper demon-
strates that each region has unilateral incentive to spend on public investment, unless
interregional-spillover of public investment is perfect. However, regions face a Prisoners’
1Unlike the present paper, Pal and Sharma (2013) focus on endogenous determination of regions’
objective functions and, thus, bypass the issue of tax-public investment interaction in the presence of
asymmetric objective functions.
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Dilemma type situation while deciding on whether to spend on public investment or not.
In the equilibrium, each region spends on public investment and ends up with Pareto in-
ferior outcome. These results hold true in a number of plausible scenarios: (a) competing
regions are concerned only about net tax revenue, (b) competing regions care for social
welfare only, (c) competing regions care for both social welfare and net tax revenue but
does not necessarily attach equal weights to social welfare and net tax revenue. These are
new results.
It also examines effects of public-investment spillover and government’s revenue orien-
tation to equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, tax rate and share of mobile capital in more
(less) revenue oriented region are positively (negatively) related to the degree of spillover
of public investment. This is because the negative effect of spillover on provision of public
investment in the more revenue oriented region is smaller than that in the less revenue
oriented region. Moreover, it shows that in the case of asymmetric revenue orientations of
competing regions, more revenue oriented region sets higher tax rate, provides less public
investment, attracts less mobile capital, earns lower net tax revenue and generates less
social welfare compared to that of the less revenue oriented region. In contrast, if the two
regions are symmetric, higher revenue orientation leads to higher tax rate, higher net tax
revenue and higher social welfare in the equilibrium, as in Pal and Sharma (2013).
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two regions, region 1 and region 2, competing for foreign owned
mobile investment capital of total amount one. Each region decides the tax rate ti (≥ 0)
on mobile capital xi (0 ≤ xi ≤ 1) and the level of public investment gi (≥ 0), i = 1, 2. The
cost to provide public investment gi by region i is assumed to be
g2i
2
, i = 1, 2. So, the net
tax revenue of region i is as follows.
NTi = tixi − g
2
i
2
, i = 1, 2. (1)
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Following Hindriks et al. (2008), we consider that the production function of a region i is
as follows.
Fi(xi, gi) = (γ + gi + θgj)xi − δx
2
i
2
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (2)
where xi is the amount of mobile capital invested in region i, γ (> 0) is the technology
parameter, δ (> 0) denotes the rate of decline in the marginal productivity of mobile
capital and θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1) is the spillover effect of public investment in one region to the
other region’s productivity. Higher value of θ denotes higher spillover. We assume that
γ > δ > 1, which ensures that marginal productivity of capital is always positive and there
exists stable interior solution in all the cases considered.
Assuming that the capital market is perfectly competitive and normalizing the price
of output to be one, we can write the returns to immobile factors of region i as, IRi =
[Fi(.) − xi ∂Fi(.)∂xi ] = δ2x2i . Therefore, following Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), Hindriks
et al. (2008) and Laussel and Le Breton (1998), we can express social welfare (SW ) as
follows.
SWi = IRi +NTi =
δ
2
x2i + [tixi −
g2i
2
], i = 1, 2. (3)
We consider that the objective function of a region i is exogenously determined, which
is given by a linear combination of its SW and NT :
Oi = αiSWi + (1− αi)NTi ; 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, (4)
= αi[
δx2i
2
] + [tixi − g
2
i
2
].
where αi and (1− αi) are the weights attached to SWi and NTi by region i. Note that, if
αi = 1 (αi = 0), Oi = SWi (Oi = NTi). Clearly, the above objective function encompasses
SWi and NTi as special cases. Moreover, α1 and α2 need not necessarily be equal. If
α1 < α2, region 1 is more revenue oriented than the region 2. That is, greater revenue
orientation of a region corresponds to lower weight to social welfare and, thus, lower weight
to returns to immobile factors in that region’s objective function. The stages of the game
involved are as follows.
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Stage 1: Region 1 and region 2 simultaneously and independently decide whether
to spend on public investment or not.
Stage 2: Regions decide their respective tax rates and level(s) of public invest-
ment, if decided to spend on public investment, simultaneously and in-
dependently.
Stage 3: Owners of mobile capital decide how much to invest in which region.
We solve this game by standard Backward Induction method. In stage 3, the arbitrage-
proof equilibrium allocation of mobile capital between the two regions is given by
F
′
1,x1
(x1, g1)− t1 = F ′2,x2(x2, g2)− t2 > 0, (5)
and x1 + x2 = 1. (6)
Solving (5) and (6), we get
x1 =
1
2
+
1
2δ
[(t2 − t1) + (1− θ)(g1 − g2)], (7a)
and x2 =
1
2
− 1
2δ
[(t2 − t1) + (1− θ)(g1 − g2)]. (7b)
Clearly, increase in tax rate of one region negatively (positively) affects the flow of mobile
capital in that (the other) region: ∂xi
∂ti
< 0 and
∂xj
∂ti
> 0; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. In contrast,
increase in public investment in one region increases (decreases) capital flow in that (the
other) region, unless there is perfect spillover of public investment: ∂xi
∂gi
> 0 and
∂xj
∂gi
< 0,
unless θ = 1; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
From (7a), (7b) and (4), we get O1 = O1(t1, t2, g1, g2, α1) and O2 = O2(t1, t2, g1, g2, α2).
It is easy to check that ∂
2O1(.)
∂t1∂t2
= 2−α1
4δ
> 0 and ∂
2O2(.)
∂t2∂t1
= 2−α2
4δ
> 0, ∀α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1]. It implies
that the marginal effect of one region’s tax rate on its own payoff increases with the increase
in other region’s tax rate. Therefore, tax rates (t1, t2) are strategic complements . On the
other hand, we can also check that ∂
2O1(.)
∂g1∂g2
= −α1(1−θ)2
4δ
< 0 and ∂
2O2(.)
∂g2∂g1
= −α2(1−θ)2
4δ
< 0,
∀α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1) . Therefore, unlike tax rates, public investments (g1, g2) are
strategic substitutes .
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We now turn to stage 2 of the game. The problem of region i in stage 2 can be written
as follows.
Max
ti,gi
Oi = αi
δ
2
x2i + [tixi −
g2i
2
]
subject to
xi =
1
2
+
1
2δ
[(tj − ti) + (1− θ)(gi − gj)]; i 6= j
Therefore, the outcomes of strategic interactions between the two regions in stage 2 are
given by the following equations.2
∂O1
∂t1
= 0⇒ t1 = (2− α1) [δ + (1− θ) (g1 − g2) + t2]
4− α1 (8a)
∂O1
∂g1
= 0⇒ g1 = (1− θ) [α1δ + (2− α1) t1 + α1t2 − α1 (1− θ) g2]
4δ − α1(1− θ)2
(8b)
∂O2
∂t2
= 0⇒ t2 = (2− α2) [δ + (1− θ) (g2 − g1) + t1]
4− α2 (9a)
∂O2
∂g2
= 0⇒ g2 = (1− θ) [α2δ + (2− α2) t2 + α2t1 − α2 (1− θ) g1]
4δ − α2(1− θ)2
(9b)
For any g1 and g2, the tax reaction functions of region 1 (TRF1) and region 2 (TRF2)
are given by (8a) and (9a), respectively. Clearly, for any given g2, if g1 increases, TRF1
shifts out and TRF2 shifts down, as depicted in Figure 1. As a result, the equilibrium
tax rate of region 1 (region 2) increases (decreases): ∂t1(g1,g2)
∂g1
> 0 and ∂t2(g1,g2)
∂g1
< 0.3 The
intuition is as follows. If there is an increase in g1 and tax rates are same across regions,
region 1 becomes more attractive destination, which enables region 1 to set higher tax rate
but induces region 2 to set lower tax rate.
On the other hand, for any t2, if t1 increases, both the regions’ public investment
reaction functions shift out as depicted in Figure 2. As a result, public investments in both
2The second order condition for maximization and the stability condition are satisfied, since δ > 1 by
assumption.
3For any g1 and g2, the equilibrium tax rates are as follows: t1(g1, g2) =
(2−α1)[(3−α2) δ+(1−θ) (g1−g2)]
6−α1−α2
and t2(g1, g2) =
(2−α2)[(3−α1) δ−(1−θ) (g1−g2)]
6−α1−α2 .
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Figure 1: Change in public investment and tax reaction functions
the regions are higher in the new equilibrium E/: ∂g1
∂t1
> 0 and ∂g2
∂t1
> 0, since δ > 1.4 The
reason is, if there is an increase in t1, region 1 becomes relatively less attractive destination
of capital. As a result, (a) region 1 increases g1 to counteract the negative effect of higher
t1 and (b) region 2 also increases g2 as it can reap higher benefit by doing so if t1 is higher.
Now, we turn to examine whether regions have unilateral incentive to spend on public
investment or not. It is easy to check that allocation of capital in a region is increasing in
public investment of that region: ∂xi
∂gi
> 0, for any gj, provided that 0 ≤ θ < 1; i, j = 1, 2,
i 6= j. Therefore, for any given gj, we have
∂Oi
∂gi
=αiδxi
∂xi
∂gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ ti
∂xi
∂gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ xi
∂ti
∂gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− gi .
It implies that, for any level of public investment in region j, returns to immobile factors
as well as tax revenue of region i increases with increase in its own public investment.
Clearly, ∂Oi
∂gi
|gi=0> 0, ∀αi, αj ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, it is optimal for each region
to spend on public investment.
4Public investment reaction functions of region 1 (IRF1) and region 2 (IRF2)
are given by (8b) and (9b), respectively. Solving the (8b) and (9b) we
get, g1 =
(1−θ) [α1 δ{2 δ−α2 (1−θ)2}+{2 (2−α1)δ−α2(1−θ)2}t1+α1{2 δ−(1−θ)2}t2]
2δ{4δ−(α1+α2)(1−θ)2} and g2 =
(1−θ) [α2 δ{2 δ−α1 (1−θ)2}+{2 (2−α1)δ−α2(1−θ)2}t2+α2{2 δ−(1−θ)2}t1]
2δ{4δ−(α1+α2)(1−θ)2} .
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Figure 2: Change in tax rate and public investment reaction functions
Proposition 1: Each region has unilateral incentive to spend on public investment, in
the case of competition for foreign owned mobile capital, irrespective of whether the com-
peting regions have symmetric objective functions or not.
Solving (8a), (8b), (9a) and (9b), we get the equilibrium tax rates, public investments
and allocation of mobile capital, given αi and αj (∈ [0, 1]), as follows:
ti =
(2− αi) δ [(3− αj) δ − (1− θ)2]
(6− αi − αj) δ − 2 (1− θ)2
> 0,
gi =
(1− θ) [(3− αj) δ − (1− θ)2]
(6− αi − αj) δ − 2 (1− θ)2
> 0 and (10)
xi =1− xj = [(3− αj) δ − (1− θ)
2]
(6− αi − αj) δ − 2 (1− θ)2
∈ (0, 1), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1); i, j = 1, 2.
It is easy to check that ∂gi
∂θ
< 0. That is, each region spends less on public investment,
if spillover is higher, irrespective of their objective functions. Also, if the extent of welfare
orientation of region i is lower than that of its rival region j (αi < αj), higher spillover
of public investment leads to higher tax rate in region i ( ∂ti
∂θ
> 0) and lower tax rate in
rival region j (
∂tj
∂θ
< 0), in the equilibrium. However, the negative effect of spillover on the
equilibrium public investment is stronger in region j compared to that in region i, if region i
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is less welfare oriented than region j: 0 > ∂gi
∂θ
>
∂gj
∂θ
, if αi < αj. As a result, higher spillover
leads to higher (lower) share of mobile capital of region i (in region j) in the equilibrium, if
region i is more revenue oriented than that of its rival region j:
∂xj
∂θ
< 0 < ∂xi
∂θ
, if αi < αj.
Proposition 2: In the case of asymmetric regions, (a) spillover of public investment
positively (negatively) affects the tax rate of the relatively more (less) revenue oriented
region, (b) negative effect of spillover on provision of public investment is stronger in
the relatively less revenue oriented region and (c) spillover of public investment positively
(negatively) affects the share of mobile capital of the relatively more (less) revenue oriented
region.
It is interesting to note that, if the two regions differ in terms of their objective functions
(i.e., if αi 6= αj), in the equilibrium, relatively more revenue oriented region sets higher tax
rate and provides less public investment compared to that of its rival region: 0 < tj < ti
and 0 < gi < gj, if αi < αj. This is because, greater revenue orientation of a region makes
it less aggressive in tax competition, since it attaches less weight to returns to immobile
factors. As a result, relatively more revenue oriented region attracts less mobile capital,
earns less net tax revenue, earns less returns to its immobile factors and achieves lower
social welfare than that of its rival region: 0 < xi < xj < 1, 0 < NTi < NTj, 0 < IRi < IRj
and 0 < SWi < SWj, if αi < αj.
5 However, if the two regions are symmetric in terms
of their objective functions, i.e., if α1 = α2 = α, higher welfare orientation (i.e., greater
value of α) of the regions leads to lower tax rate, lower net tax revenue and lower social
welfare in each of the two regions: ∂ti
∂α
< 0, ∂NTi
∂α
< 0 and ∂SWi
∂α
< 0, i = 1, 2. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. Symmetric regions set the same tax rate and provide the
same level of public investment in the equilibrium. Thus, each region gets half of the total
mobile capital, no matter whether regions are more or less concerned about net tax revenue
than social welfare. However, greater welfare orientation of the regions make them more
aggressive players in tax competition and, thus, intensifies the race-to-the-bottom in tax
5Note that each region earns positive net tax revenue in the equilibrium, irrespective of their objective
functions. In other words, governments’ budget constraints are not binding in the present context.
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rates. On the other hand, choice of public investment remains insensitive to the extent of
welfare orientation of the regions, since the positive effect of greater welfare orientation of
a region on its public invest gets exactly offset by the negative effect of the rival region’s
greater welfare orientation.
Proposition 3: The equilibrium share of mobile capital, net tax revenue and welfare are
less in the relatively more revenue oriented region than that in the relatively more welfare
oriented region. However, if competing regions have the same level of revenue orientation,
i.e. if the objective functions of the regions are same, greater revenue orientation of the
regions leads to higher tax rate, higher net tax revenue and higher welfare.
Now, substituting the expressions for ti, gi and xi from (10) in the expression for
Oi, we get Oi =
[(4−αi) δ−(1−θ)2] [(3−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]2
2 [(6−αi−αj) δ−2 (1−θ)2]2
= Og,gi , where superscript ‘g, g’ denotes
that both the regions spend on public investment. Note that, if only region i spends
on public investment, the stage 2 equilibrium public investments and capital allocation
can be obtained by solving (8a), (8b), (9a) and gj = 0, and the corresponding Oi =
(3−αj)2 δ2 [(4−αi) δ−(1−θ)2]
2 [(6−αi−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]2
= Og,0i and Oj =
(4−αj) δ [(3−αi) δ−(1−θ)2]2
2 [(6−αi−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]2
= Og,0j . Similarly, if only
region j provides public investment, we get Oi =
(4−αi) δ [(3−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]2
2 [(6−αi−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]2
= O0,gi and Oj =
(3−αi)2 δ2 [(4−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]
2 [(6−αi−αj) δ−(1−θ)2]2
= O0,gj . If none of the regions spend on public investment, Oi =
(4−αi) (3−αj)2 δ
2 (6−αi−αj)2 = O
0,0
i . We depict the normal form of the stage 1 game in Figure 3.
Region 2
No public investment Public investment
Region 1
No public investment O0,01 , O
0,0
2 O
0,g
1 , O
0,g
2
Public investment Og,01 , O
g,0
2 O
g,g
1 , O
g,g
2
Figure 3: Decision to spend on public investment
From Figure 3, it is easy to observe that Og,g1 > O
0,g
1 and O
g,g
2 > O
g,0
2 ; ∀α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1]
and 0 ≤ θ < 1. It implies that, if region 2 (region 1) spends on public investment, it
is optimal for region 1 (region 2) also to spend on public investment. Moreover, we get
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Og,01 > O
0,0
1 and O
0,g
2 > O
0,0
2 ; ∀α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ θ < 1. Thus, in the equilibrium,
both the regions spend on public investment irrespective of the weights attached to SW
and NT by the regions. The intuition behind this result is as follows. If a region spends
on public investment, the other region needs to counteract that by undercutting the tax
and spending on public investment, since only tax under cutting is sub-optimum from both
net tax revenue and social welfare point of view. On the other hand, if a region does not
spend on public investment, by providing public investment the other region can increase
the tax rate to some extent and still attracts more mobile capital, which in turn leads to
higher net tax revenue as well as higher returns to immobile factors.
However, net tax revenue as well as social welfare of each region is lower when the
regions spend on public investment compared to that in the case of no spending on public
investment: Og,gi < O
0,0
i , ∀αi ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ θ < 1; i = 1, 2. It implies that the competing
regions face a Prisoners’ dilemma type of situation while deciding whether to spend on
public investment or not and end up with Pareto inferior outcomes. Therefore, we have
the following.
Proposition 4: In the equilibrium, both the regions spend on public investment and
end up with Pareto inferior outcomes.
In this analysis, we have assumed that tax rates and levels of public investments are
chosen by the regions simultaneously. However, there is no a priori reason for considering
simultaneous choice of the two instruments. In fact, in the literature on tax competi-
tion, it is also considered that regions decide public investments before they set tax rates.
Nonetheless, the results of this analysis are not sensitive to such alteration in sequence
of events. The reason is, in the present context, public investment does not have any di-
rect effect on returns to immobile factors, it acts only via the allocation of mobile capital.
We are omitting the detailed calculations for the sequential choice game, which are quite
straightforward, to economize on space.6
6These are available on request from the authors.
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3 Conclusion
In this paper we have endogenized the governments’ decisions to spend on productivity
enhancing public investment in the case of competition for foreign owned mobile capital
between two regions, by allowing for the possibility of asymmetric regions in terms of
their objective functions. our set-up encompasses social welfare maximization and net
tax revenue maximization by any region as two special cases. We have also examined
the implication of interregional spillover of productivity enhancing public investment and
revenue orientations of the regions on equilibrium outcomes.
We have demonstrated that, unless there is perfect spillover, each region has unilateral
incentive to spend on public investment and, in the equilibrium, both the regions provide
public investment. However, the equilibrium payoffs are Pareto dominated by the payoffs
corresponding to no provision of public investment. These results hold true, irrespective
of whether regions are symmetric or asymmetric.
We have also shown that spillover of public investment has differential impacts on
equilibrium outcomes of the two regions, when regions are asymmetric. If one region is
more revenue oriented than the other, higher spillover of public investments leads to higher
tax rate as well as higher share of mobile capital in the relatively more revenue oriented
region. Further, for any given degree of spillover, more revenue oriented region gets less
mobile capital, less tax revenue and less social welfare than that of the more welfare
oriented region. However, if the two regions are equally revenue oriented, greater revenue
orientation leads to higher tax rate, higher net tax revenue as well as higher social welfare in
the equilibrium, while levels of public investments and allocation of mobile capital remains
unaltered.
In this paper, we have considered that regions’ objective functions are exogenously
determined. It seems to be interesting to extend the present analysis by allowing for
endogenous determination of the weights given to social welfare and net tax revenue in the
objective functions. It might also be interesting to examine the implications of sequential
move by the regions (i.e., leader-follower game) and of other types of asymmetry between
12
regions (e.g., different country size, mobility cost of capital, productivity, etc.) in the
present context. We leave these for future research.
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